Verzopen Onschuld

Weet je wat ik zie als jij weer dronken bent feestjes allemaal feestjes feestjes allemaal feestjes om ons heen en tijdens alle festiviteiten ben jij daar helemaal alleen jij daar met anderen samen samen totaal alleen want in al die feestjes feestjes gaat alles en iedereen om je heen niet een van die feestjes feestjes kan je daar binnen raken dat stramme gebeente kraken van al dat overdreven niets toch nog iets maken die zinloze drugte tussen mortel en steen in dat stoffig omhulsel, die feesttent kortstondig op palen gezet tegen verwaaien bevestigd met storm lijnen opgetogen zonder vreugd en deugd in dat zieltogend hol gevuld door alcohol stil vercommerend in rumoer en rommel veroorzaakt voor aangelengde kom kommercie en als ik dat er al in zie met mijn verblinde ogen tussen dovemansoren dan ziet iedereen zichzelf daar zo zielig alleen rondom een op lucht malende massa in een stoffig omhulsel, tussen mortel en steen in muren bijgezet ten behoeve van de cultuurwet van wollige luchtige zwaartekracht kokhalsend verlangen naar meerwaarde tot diep diep onder in de nacht gehavend aan de pot voor anker in de haven van elk laatste feestje tot je sober bent begraven in dezelfde stilte ook tijdens het echt aller laatste feestje nu eens niet officieel gesponsord door de brouwerij ook al ben jij daar zinkend naar beneden zonder twijfel de overvloed van hun overdadig geproduceerd ontij

Der Nacken protestiert weiter. 16. Juli

Nach den gestrigen Erkundungen tut mein Nacken heute noch mehr weh. Deshalb habe ich mich entschieden, im Hotel zu bleiben und nur zu schreiben. Ich wollte zumindest eine Wegbeschreibung ausführlich in meinem Tagebuch beschreiben. Dafür brauchte ich sowieso mehr Zeit. Außerdem versuche ich, so viele Braille-Notizen wie möglich vorzubereiten, damit ich den Wegbeschreibungen später leichter folgen kann.

Heute hatten wir außerdem geplant, mit Kai Friedrichshain zu besuchen. Auf der Website von Berlin für Blinde wollte ich auch einige Objekte in der Umgebung finden. Diese Website gefällt mir immer besser. Dort konnte ich zum Beispiel eine Audiodeskription der Skulptur “Heiliger Georg und der Drache” lesen. Die große Skulptur befindet sich an der Promenade Am Spreeufer im Nikolaiviertel.

Noch interessanter fand ich allerdings die Wegbeschreibung zum Verein Handiclapped in Friedrichshain. Der Verein befindet sich in einer alten Feuerwache. Auf der Website steht, dass die Organisation satzungsgemäß Kultur und Kunst sowie die Unterstützung von Menschen mit Behinderung fördert. Besonders gefreut habe ich mich darüber, dass ich diesen Ort auch ganz einfach mit meiner U-Bahn erreichen kann.

Später rief Kai jedoch an und sagte unser Treffen wegen gesundheitlicher Probleme ab. Deshalb werde ich Friedrichshain erst später besuchen, wenn es meinem Nacken wieder besser geht. Was für ein schmerzhafter Tag! Irgendwie scheint dieser Tag für jeden von uns mit seinen eigenen Herausforderungen begonnen zu haben. Ich, Mindaugas und Kai kämpfen gerade alle mit unterschiedlichen Beschwerden und Hindernissen. Eigentlich fühlt sich Mindaugas in dieser Zeit ohnehin nicht besonders stabil... Von zu Hause habe ich ebenso leider nur eine wärmende Creme mitgenommen. Andere Mittel gegen Nacken- oder Rückenschmerzen habe ich gar nicht dabei. Trotzdem gehe ich heute zur Yogastunde. Vielleicht helfen mir das Dehnen und die leichte Bewegung, mich wieder etwas wohler zu fühlen.

Deshalb machten wir uns zusammen mit Mindaugas und unseren Hunden bereits gegen halb vier vom Hotel aus auf den Weg. Wir mussten einmal in die S-Bahn umsteigen, aber den Weg kannte ich schon von meiner Erkundung in der vergangenen Woche. Deshalb fühlte ich mich diesmal ganz sicher. Als wir am Bahnhof Grunewald ankamen, stellten wir allerdings fest, dass der Aufzug leider immer noch nicht funktionierte. Mindaugas musste deshalb bis zur nächsten Station weiterfahren, während ich allein zur Yogastunde ging. Den Bahnhof zu verlassen war einfach. Nur der Weg vom Ausgang bis zum Zebrastreifen war wieder voller Busse, Baustellen und Menschen. Eine Frau half mir durch diese Hindernisse. Alles Weitere fand ich dann schon wieder selbstständig.

In der Yogastunde fühlte ich mich heute auch viel wohler. Dieses Gefühl der Fremdheit war verschwunden und ich konnte den Moment wieder genießen. Manchmal ist mir das Yoga-Vokabular noch etwas fremd, aber langsam lerne ich immer mehr dazu.

Noch etwas Schönes: Nach dem Yoga wurden wir zu einem privaten Abendessen eingeladen. Ulf, der Mann meiner Freundin, wollte für uns zu Hause kochen. Deshalb lasse ich meine heutige Eindrücke nur kurz beschrieben und freue mich stattdessen auf das Essen. Es wird übrigens keine typisch deutsche Küche geben, sondern Pasta mit Soße. Die FleischBuletten werden allerdings auf deutsche Art zubereitet. Ich werde sie natürlich nicht probieren, denn ich bin Vegetarierin.

Ein ruhiger Sommerabend, eine stille Straße in Lichtenberg, nette Gesellschaft und hausgemachtes Essen – das klingt wirklich nach einer wohlverdienten Erholung.

#00692285 is rebranding and Moving to Substack

Dear Readers,

This is to inform you that I'm moving to Substack. I've enjoyed the relative obscurity of write.as but as my channel grows I've realized I need to be where the readers are. If you've enjoyed my writings I urge you to subscribe to my page on Substack here to continue receiving my posts each Friday.

One Time Pen on Substack

After several complaints of my dreadful name I've also finally found a clever title for my blog: One Time Pen

The fluctuations in the CT market during 2026 were both unexpected and inevitable.

In the first half of 2026 (H1), based on public tender data, a total of 1,137 CT units were procured, amounting to approximately RMB 7.98 billion. Factoring in non-disclosed transactions, China's total CT procurement volume for H1 2026 is estimated at approximately 1,624 units, with a total value of around RMB 11.4 billion, representing a year-on-year decrease of about 24.7%. Details are as follows:

1）Photon-counting CT sales declined by 55.6% YoY, indicating that the initial wave of demand has largely been satisfied. Due to high procurement costs, a significant second wave of demand has yet to emerge.

2）256-slice CT sales grew by 28.8% YoY, while 128-slice CT sales fell by 46.6% YoY. Demand for high-end CT remains robust, though the market increasingly recognizes the premium positioning of 256-slice systems.

3）64-slice CT sales increased by 26.9% YoY, confirming its status as the most cost-effective product for medical institutions.

4）Sub-64-slice CT sales dropped by 38.0% YoY. This reflects both near-saturation in primary care settings and an ongoing upgrade trend toward 64-slice systems at the grassroots level.

I. Industry Overview and Centralized Procurement (VBP)

Regarding end-user hierarchy, Grade 3 Class A hospitals remain the dominant purchasers, accounting for approximately 29.2% of total procurement volume and 50.7% of total value. Procurement has further concentrated in tertiary hospitals compared to the same period last year.

In terms of market segments, the share of sub-64-slice CT has fallen to 32.8%. Procurement continues to shift toward 64-slice and higher systems, particularly 256-slice CT and photon-counting CT. These two segments combined accounted for 26.3% of units procured but represented 61.4% of total expenditure.

Meanwhile, procurement of radiotherapy large-bore CT and hybrid OR sliding-rail CT remained largely consistent with the same period last year. This supports forecasts of a stable annual baseline of 100–150 units for large-bore CT and 30–50 units for sliding-rail CT.

The IBMD Data Center discloses, for the first time, VBP performance data for CT in H1 2026.Average unit prices fell as follows: 256-slice CT down 35.39% YoY, 128-slice CT down 53.01% YoY, 64-slice CT down 40.43% YoY, and sub-64-slice CT down 13.61% YoY.

II. CT Industry Scorecards

Statistics indicate that China's CT market comprises nearly 100 brands. In H1 2026, 20 brands recorded sales volume, including approximately 14 in conventional CT and 6 in mobile CT.

In terms of market share, the industry exhibits a distinct three-tier structure:

Tier 1:​ United Imaging Healthcare, GE Healthcare, Siemens Healthineers.

Tier 2:​ Philips, Neusoft Medical.

Tier 3:​ Anke High-Tech, SinoVision, Canon Medical Systems, Wandong Medical.

The CR5 (top 5 vendors) captured 81.8% of total units and 92.3% of total value, underscoring extreme market concentration. United Imaging Healthcare (UIH) has secured the top position across both metrics. GE, Siemens, and Philips maintain strong performance in high-end and 64-slice segments. Anke has emerged as a notable contender, particularly excelling in VBP scenarios. Consolidated brand rankings by CT segment (H1 2026) are summarized below.

1. Photon-Counting CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 8 photon-counting CT units procured, totaling approximately RMB 393 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 42.415 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 11 units, valued at approximately RMB 485 million.

2. 256-Slice CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 291 units of 256-slice CT (including 256/320-slice, high-end dual-source, and dual-layer detector systems), totaling approximately RMB 4.56 billion, with an average unit price of about RMB 15.671 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 416 units, valued at approximately RMB 6.515 billion.

3. 128-Slice CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 98 units of high-end CT (including 128/160-slice and dual-source systems), totaling approximately RMB 761 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 7.765 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 140 units, valued at approximately RMB 1.087 billion.

4. 64-Slice CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 299 units of high-end CT (including 64/80-slice systems), totaling approximately RMB 1.226 billion, with an average unit price of about RMB 4.100 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 427 units, valued at approximately RMB 1.751 billion.

5. Sub-64-Slice CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 373 units of high-end CT (including 16/32/40/48-slice systems), totaling approximately RMB 683 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 1.830 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 533 units, valued at approximately RMB 975 million.

6. Radiotherapy Large-Bore CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 50 units of radiotherapy large-bore CT, totaling approximately RMB 265 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 5.291 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 71 units, valued at approximately RMB 378 million.

7. Hybrid OR Sliding-Rail CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 10 units of hybrid OR sliding-rail CT, totaling approximately RMB 92 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 9.157 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 14 units, valued at approximately RMB 131 million.

9. Mobile CT

In H1 2026, public tenders recorded 8 units of mobile CT, totaling approximately RMB 55 million, with an average unit price of about RMB 6.864 million. Adjusting for non-disclosure, the estimated national volume is 11 units, valued at approximately RMB 78 million.

Statistical Period:​ 2026 (Announcement dates: January 1, 2026 – June 30, 2026).

Statistical Scope:​ Based on publicly disclosed winning bid data. Excludes undisclosed projects. Certain fields (brand, model, price) may be incomplete; price gaps were not filled. Excludes maintenance contracts, spare parts, and other non-new equipment procurements.

Data Sources:​ Publicly collected from national/provincial government procurement websites, public resource trading centers, hospital tender portals, major Chinese third-party bidding data platforms, and select tender agencies.

Guangdong Institute of Advanced Biomaterials and Medical Devices (IBMD), China

A public institution of Guangdong Province, China.

Established by South China University of Technology, with the support of four national ministries and commissions.

Led by Professor Wang Yingjun, Member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering.

Focused on collaborative innovation and technology commercialization in advanced medical devices and biomaterials.

IBMD Data Center

Medical device data governance, analytics, and digital applications.

Covering registration, regulatory oversight, procurement, market access, clinical application, medical insurance reimbursement, and industry development.

In my role as Ambassador Extraordinary for Unfinished Questions, I am occasionally asked to assist others in their enquiries, particularly where those enquiries have become entangled in the quest for a truth. These requests usually arrive in manila envelopes. There is, in most cases, a letter inside, though the letter is often more a courtesy detail than an instrument. The envelope carries the real appeal. One can tell from the crease at the flap, the pressure of the address, the way the gum has been licked in haste or sealed in despair. Letters may exaggerate. Envelopes seldom do. They have travelled against things.

On the morning in question, no envelope arrived. I was making an inventory of postponed interrogatives when I heard a sound at the lower edge of my door. Not a knock. Not even a tap. More the sort of dry uncertain scuffle made by paper attempting dignity on a polished floor. I looked down. A sheet had inserted itself halfway into the room. It lay there for several moments, neither entering nor retreating, as though uncertain whether it was an application, a confession, or a weather report. “Come in,” I said. The sheet advanced by perhaps half an inch. This was not shyness. Shyness has rhythm. This was damage. I left my desk and bent to lift it, but the sheet trembled so violently at my approach that I withdrew at once and allowed it to proceed in its own time. It came forward by small jerks, gathering itself, losing itself, gathering itself again. By the time it reached the carpet beneath my chair, one corner had folded under and a faint grey trail of pencil dust followed behind it.

I had seen hesitations before. I had seen questions that had been crossed out, questions that had been answered too early, questions that had disguised themselves as observations, questions that had enlisted question marks without earning them. But this one had been disabled almost beyond grammar. The upper portion had been typed on an IBM Selectric typewriter. I recognised the print at once. There is a particular authority to the Selectric: each letter seems to have arrived from a small, well-governed planet. The marks were clean, black, and certain in the way official things are often certain before they understand the case. The typed line read: What becomes of the small mark when There the sentence stopped. Not at a full stop. Not at a comma. Not even at that frail bridge by which a dash offers to continue while pretending to pause. The paper had been ripped from the machine just after the word when, leaving the fibres lifted and pale at the right-hand edge, as though the page had bitten its own tongue.

In the margin, several continuances had been attempted in pencil. The first leaned upward: when it is mistaken for punctuation. The second had been pressed so hard that the graphite shone: when it is promoted to meaning The third seemed to have been written while the hand was turning away: when it is left above the wrong letter The fourth curved downward, crowded against the torn edge: when the word goes on without it Below these, in a smaller script, almost apologetic: when it discovers it was never small I carried the sheet to my desk and placed it on the green blotter. It flinched at the brass paperweight, so I moved the paperweight to the far side of the inkwell. I have found that many injured questions respond poorly to instruments of administrative compression. “You have come without an envelope,” I said. The typed line remained still. The pencilled endings trembled faintly. “I was not sent,” it said. The voice did not come from any one word. It seemed to rise from the space between the typed certainty and the pencilled attempts.“You came yourself?” A little crease formed near the torn edge. “I think so.”

With unfinished questions, “I think so” often contains more testimony than a page of sworn evidence. I took out Form UQ-17, Preliminary Reception of an Incomplete Interrogative, and uncapped my pen. The first question on the form was simple. Nature of defect: I looked at the sheet. Interrupted? Incomplete? Fragmentary? Marginally unstable? Subject to continuance? Possibly self-approaching? None of these seemed hospitable. The question watched my pen. “Am I to be classified?” it asked. “Only at first.” “What happens after first?” I set down the pen. In the silence, the Selectric letters seemed to grow darker. I found myself thinking of the machine that had made them. Not a typewriter in the old manner, with its forest of arms and clattering ascents, but a creature of rotation. A typing element, a small perfect globe, covered in reversed letters, each waiting for its moment of tilt. On the Selectric, no letter simply marched to the page. Each had first to turn, to present itself at the necessary angle, to accept the brief violence by which potential became print.

I looked again at the sheet. The pencilled continuances lay to the right of the typed line, untidy and subordinate. At least, that is how I first saw them. A main road and its ditch. A sentence and its failures. A proper beginning and a margin full of nervous volunteers. The question must have noticed my looking. “Those are not mine,” it said. “Whose are they?” “I do not know.” “Did someone add them?” “I remember a hand.” “Only one?” The paper rustled. “More than one pressure.” I leaned closer. The first pencilled line had been written lightly, as though by someone hoping not to be overheard. The second had cut into the fibres. The third paused after wrong. The fourth had been dragged downward, almost falling. The fifth, the smallest, seemed less written than discovered. I touched the edge of the desk, not the page. “Which one do you prefer?” The question curled. “I thought that was why I had come.” “To have one chosen?” “To be finished.”

Outside the window, a delivery van reversed into the lane, emitting three small beeps of civic warning. A gull objected from a chimney. Somewhere in the building a drawer was closed with unnecessary conviction. The world was behaving as it usually did. That should have been a comfort. I returned to the form. Probable remedy: Completion? Reconstruction? Answer? Referral to Syntax? Return to author? Place under observation? The words stood ready in their little boxes, each of them more confident than useful. The question’s torn edge lifted slightly in the draught from the window. “Is there a procedure?” it asked. “There are several.” “Do they work?” “Sometimes they produce a result.”

The pencilled line when the word goes on without it darkened. I turned the page a little, only to save it from the glare. No ceremony accompanied the movement. Nothing in the room altered its substance. The blotter remained green. The desk remained scratched along the left edge where a ruler had once been used impatiently. The paper remained torn. The typed words remained where they had been. But the margin changed. Or, more nearly, I changed in relation to it. The pencilled endings were no longer beside the sentence. They rose from it. They became steps, not alternatives. Attempts, not failures. The typed fragment no longer appeared as a road abandoned at the edge of a cliff. It was a doorway opening into several possible rooms. I turned the page a little more. The question gave a gasp. “Did that hurt?” “No.” “Then?” “I had not known I could be seen that way.”

I waited. Among unfinished questions, speech often follows only after the room has agreed not to hurry it. The graphite of the smallest line caught the light. when it discovers it was never small I read the typed fragment again, then the pencil, then the tear, then the space where an ending had been expected to arrive and had not. “What becomes of the small mark when” I said. The question listened to itself in my voice. I tried the first continuance. “What becomes of the small mark when it is mistaken for punctuation?” A faint shiver passed through the page. “Too injured?” I asked. “Too familiar.” I tried the second. “What becomes of the small mark when it is promoted to meaning?” The word promoted gleamed beneath its pressure. “Too official,” the question said. The third. “What becomes of the small mark when it is left above the wrong letter?” The paper seemed to go very still. “Too close,” it whispered. I did not ask to what. The fourth. “What becomes of the small mark when the word goes on without it?” The torn edge lifted, then fell. “Too lonely.” The fifth I did not speak at once. The smallest script waited. “What becomes of the small mark when it discovers it was never small?”

The question did not tremble. For several seconds, the page was quiet in a way that paper rarely manages. Not blank. Not empty. Quiet. Then it said, “That one frightens me.” “Because it may be true?” “Because if it is true, all the others were disguises.” I looked at the pencil marks again. They no longer seemed to compete. Each had approached the same door from a different street. “Perhaps not disguises,” I said.“What, then?” I lifted Form UQ-17 and placed it face down. The question watched the form disappear. “Are you abandoning procedure?” “Only its posture.” That seemed to satisfy neither of us, but it permitted a little more air into the room. I opened my notebook instead. The notebook has no boxes. It cannot compel a phenomenon to arrive in the 'correct' shape. For that reason it has often proved more trustworthy than official documentation.

“What do you remember of the machine?” I asked. The question softened. “The globe.” “The typing element?” “A small world. Full of faces turned away until called.” “Letters?” “And numbers. Marks. Shapes. All waiting backwards. “Backwards?” “So they could become right on the page.” I wrote that down. All waiting backwards so they could become right on the page. The question seemed embarrassed by having said something useful. “And then?” “Rotation. Tilt. Strike. I was coming through. I had begun. I had not yet learned what I was asking.” The torn edge lifted again, as if remembering the pull. “Then the paper was taken.” “By whom?” “I do not know. The hand was quick. Not cruel at first. Then afraid.” “Afraid of you?” “Afraid of what I might ask next.”

A bus passed outside, its upper windows full of faces temporarily arranged into destination. The room dimmed, brightened, resumed. “Were the pencilled lines added then?“ “Afterwards. At a table, I think. Not this one. A softer table. Someone tried to help.” “And did they?” The question considered this. “They made me more possible.” This was the first time I had heard it speak without breaking. I turned the page back to its original position. At once the pencil marks resumed their place in the margin, anxious and secondary. The question made a small sound. I turned it again. The steps returned. Again back. Again margin. Again tilt. At the fourth turning, the question laughed.

It was not a large laugh. It would not have disturbed a comma. But it travelled through the page and loosened something in the torn fibres.“I thought I was damaged,” it said. “You are damaged.” The laughter ceased. I waited, because one must be careful at such moments not to rescue too quickly. “And?” it asked. “And still asking.” The smallest pencilled line grew visible again. I slid the official form to the edge of the desk and took a clean sheet from the drawer. The question recoiled. “I am not going to copy you,” I said. “Then what?” “I am going to sit beside you.” This seemed to require consideration.

I placed the clean sheet to the right of the torn one, so that the margin of the first touched the blankness of the second. The two papers made a little seam. On the blank sheet, I wrote only the typed fragment: What becomes of the small mark when – Then I stopped. The question waited. I did not add any of the pencilled endings. Instead, beneath the fragment, I wrote it again. What becomes of the small mark when And beneath that, again. What becomes of the small mark when The page beside me rustled with unease. “Why are you repeating me?” “To see whether you remain the same.” “I do not.” “No.” “Is that permitted?” “In some offices, no.” “In this one?” I looked at the crossed-out headings on my old forms, the shelf of deferred matters, the envelopes that had carried more truth in their seams than in their contents. I looked at the Selectric letters, born from a globe that had turned before it spoke. “In this one,” I said, “we may allow it.”

The question moved closer to the clean sheet. The first repetition sat stiffly, imitating the original. The second had already begun to feel less like a copy and more like an invitation. By the third, the words seemed to be listening ahead of themselves. The pencil marks on the torn page no longer shook. They arranged themselves, not in order of correctness, but in order of courage.

The question spoke. “What becomes of the small mark when it is mistaken for punctuation?” The room accepted the sentence. It spoke again. “What becomes of the small mark when it is promoted to meaning?” The brass paperweight gave back a small dull light. Again. “What becomes of the small mark when it is left above the wrong letter?” This time the page did not flinch. Again. “What becomes of the small mark when the word goes on without it?” The silence afterwards was not empty. Finally, so quietly that I almost mistook it for the settling of paper: “What becomes of the small mark when it discovers it was never small?”

The question lay still. I did not answer. A draught moved under the door and lifted the corner of Form UQ-17, which turned itself over with a dry officious sigh. The line Probable remedy stared up at me, eager for usefulness. I placed another blank sheet over it. The question seemed to approve. “What am I now?” it asked. I considered the available replies and found each arriving too heavily. A completed question? No. A repaired question? No. A better question? Perhaps, but even that seemed to place a medal where a witness should stand. The page shifted toward the clean sheet and rested there, torn edge against fresh paper, as if testing whether continuation required ownership.

“Try asking,” I said. The question gathered itself. Not quickly. Not fluently. Not as a sentence that had been waiting fully formed behind a curtain. It came by small movements, part type, part pencil, part tear, part blankness. “What becomes of a question,” it said, “when it stops asking to be answered and begins asking to be understood?” The words remained in the room. No bell rang. No file closed. No answer descended with its hat in its hand.

Outside, the gull returned to its complaint. The delivery van departed. Somewhere down the corridor a clerk sneezed twice, revised the sneeze, and sneezed once more. The question looked at me. “Is that finished?” I turned the page a fraction, no more than the width of a tittle. “Not finished,” I said. The graphite brightened. “Then what?” The typed letters, the pencil, the tear, the clean sheet, the hidden form beneath it, the memory of the small globe turning toward impact, all held their positions without becoming still. “Ready to continue,” I said. And for the first time since it had entered my office, the unfinished question did not try to become anything else.

✒️ Sigi

I was playing games with T like normal, and there was a person in our games that we were joking around and so after a bit, we invited them to Call with us and they seemed very friendly. I feel like it’s kind of surprising in a way how often it feels like people just could’ve stumbled into my life in different avenues. I think about the people at the gym that I have recently met and have been really friendly at first, but I guess I also feel like with all of these people or at least a large majority of them friendships start off with I guess too much of an expectation for me, I feel like the friendships are all going to be much more reliable and faster case than what happens in practice and that caused me a decent amount of strike and I guess by saying it out loud I recognize that this is more Reid of my experience with friendships being really intense rapid things because of how I grew up and so even though I think I have recovered from that enough to be at the point where I’m more appropriately pacing my interactions with people, I think I might still both expect a lot more from people than is reasonable, and I might still come off as two. I guess that’s something to be aware of and it kind of sucks because I don’t have any kind of like universal framework or benchmark or something like that that I could use to say oh this is what this is what is normal so far but what can you do you know?

Named for Linden Boulevard in NYC, which runs from Brooklyn to Queens.

“St. Jermaine”: gin, elderflower liqueur, crème de mûre, lemon, simple syrup

Lobster & Crab Knuckle Sandwich

Lamb Tartare: mint, fennel, cherry chutney, house-made focaccia

The menu “pays homage to the African-American, Caribbean, Jewish, South Asian, and many other influences found along Linden Boulevard.”

I have made the same hiring mistake twice, so I feel qualified to warn people off it. Both times my team was drowning, both times the obvious fix looked like another pair of hands, and both times a chunk of the work I hired for turned out to be work no person should have been doing at all.

Key takeaways

• Separate every task into decisions (need a human) and procedures (need doing by anyone competent).
• Procedures hide inside roles that look like judgment roles, which is how teams over-hire.
• Procedure work is invisible to promotion conversations, so leaving talented people on it quietly caps their careers.
• Much of the procedures pile is recurring browser work, which is now delegable without a new hire.

The hiring mistake I made twice

The obvious fix for an overloaded team is capacity. But a lot of what looks like workload is procedure dressed up as judgment. Ask an analyst what they do and they describe recommendations. Watch the week and a third of it is assembling the data underneath the recommendations, which is transport, not analysis.

Decisions need a human, procedures need doing

Here is the line I wish I had drawn earlier. A decision needs judgment, taste, and accountability. A procedure needs to be done correctly and repeatedly, and it does not care who does it. Every team I have run leaks the most time on recurring browser procedures: pulling weekly numbers from several dashboards, checking a set of sources each morning, moving records between two systems that were never introduced.

Why procedure work quietly caps careers

This is the part managers miss. Advancement compounds on visible judgment, and procedure work is invisible to every promotion conversation. The person known for sharp calls moves up. The person who spent those same hours compiling the spreadsheet under the call does not, even if they worked harder. Leaving a talented person on transport is not just wasted hours. It is a quiet ceiling.

The procedures pile is now delegable

What changed my approach is that the procedures pile no longer requires a hire, because much of it is repetitive browser work and the tools have caught up. One of my leads moved her recurring routes, the metrics rounds, the source sweep, the record transfers, to the browser automation at allyhub.com. It runs the routines in her own browser session and lands them in one summary she reads in fifteen minutes. Setup was a couple of evenings and some corrections it kept, and after that the routine ran on its own and got quicker each time rather than needing to be re-taught. Her reclaimed hours went into client calls, the highest-value and most-postponed thing on her list.

Two rules for any delegation

Keep review in the loop, because delegation without review is abdication and the failure modes are just quieter with software. And reassign the freed time on purpose, because capacity freed without a destination refills with the same low-value work inside a month.

Run the one-week audit first

The diagnosis is cheap. Take one representative week, sort every block into decision or procedure, and look at the ratio. For most knowledge teams the procedure share lands between a quarter and a third. That number is your real staffing plan, and a surprising amount of it does not need a hire at all.

We just launched a our new Embed.as service to power Rich Embeds on Write.as! This change is largely behind the scenes — our writers can continue sharing links from our many supported providers in their blog posts, and they’ll keep turning into nice embedded content without any extra work.

A new service

A few months ago, we got to work on our very own rich media-embedding service so we could switch away from the previous one we used, Embedly. While it worked well, Embedly was far overpriced for our needs, and didn’t give us the kind of flexibility we wanted, especially for building for an ever-evolving open web.

Now, we’ve launched Embed.as as a totally in-house service to provide this little feature that many of our users enjoy. To use it, you don’t need to go farther than your Write.as editor — simply paste in the URL of any post, video, photo, playlist, etc. on its own line in your blog post (supported sites shown below), and once published, it’ll turn into a gorgeous rendering of whatever content you’re sharing.

Supported Providers

All our Pro users can share content from any of these sites to have them show up nicely in your blog posts:

• Are.na
• Bandcamp
• Bluesky
• Codepen
• Flickr
• Giphy
• Imgur
• Kickstarter
• Mixcloud
• SoundCloud
• Spotify
• Typeform
• Vimeo
• YouTube

Coming up

While this is mostly a behind-the-scenes change today, we have more plans for Embed.as, including bringing Rich Embeds to WriteFreely.

As this launches and more people try it out here on Write.as, we’re going to continue testing in the real world, gathering feedback, improving how it works, and adding providers.

Then beyond that, we’ll add support for WriteFreely admins to connect with Embed.as, so their blog / community can have easy embeds too, using this new privacy-preserving service. Based on the feedback we get, we’ll likely offer this at a very affordable price.

We hope you continue enjoying writing here! You can follow along with Embed.as updates in the fediverse: @embed_as@musing.studio, and if you have any feedback or suggestions, we’d love to hear them on the forum!

A small but helpful fix is out for federated blogs! Now, changes to your blog — title, description, icon, etc. — will all go out to the fediverse, so your followers will always see the most up-to-date version, no matter where they are!

#updates #improvements #fediverse #writeas

I'd honestly enjoy reading many posts by the people here on their own presidential platform. Read this here for the idea behind this post. I'm sure it won't be as popular of a post, but that is fine with me.

I'm a little older than the person posting that and I've still not run for president (don't most people by now?). I honestly never would even if I had the popularity, though I have been told I have been voted for by my brother haha. You can see their post is mostly joking, it reminds me of Vermin Supreme (see here and here for merch), not that their platform is similar but that they kinda seem to see the joke in it all. I actually wear a straw hat, partially because I hate sunscreen! So Cherry really resonated with me.

Just for fun I'd like to share a few tidbits on what ideas and ideals I personally would put as hot topics in my presidential platform.

• Abolish all taxes since it is theft.
• Abolish the federal reserve and all central banking since it is fraud.
• Shift all federal agencies and programs into a voluntary system. For an example make the FDA a voluntary certification program. If a company is not in compliance with FDA regulation they have to explicitly notify those buying or using such products and services. This would apply to the USDA, EPA, CDC, NIH, FTC, and countless other programs of sorts. Use your imagination of sorts to see how a voluntary certificate system could perhaps make this even better than it is – it wouldn't take much.
• Abolish building code. Along with this support and promote an educational program to teach many how to build their own housing from local and low costing materials. Help homeless build affordable and effective low costing housing with straw-bale, rammed earth, earthbag, cob, and more. Take donations to help fund such a thing and bring in skilled workers to help with this. Also promote and support through voluntary means humanure composting toilets, rainwater catchment, greywater systems, and more sustainable solutions to major problems
• To make this post very short (I could go on way too long) I'll skip to the big ones...
• Abolish government
• Abolish presidents
• Now I don't have to show up for the silly job, swear an oath (which I cannot do), and have the deaths of many on my head.

Further digging (repeats):

The Creature from Jekyll Island – by G. Edward Griffin

The Humanure Handbook

Christian Patriotism – Alonzo Trevier Jones

The Kingdom of God is within you – Leo Tolstoy

(Another version here)

Audio book version of “The Kingdom of God is within you”

What I believe – Leo Tolstoy

Audio book version of “What I Believe”

Christian Non-Resistance – Adin Ballou

Audio book version of “Christian Non-Resistance”

https://libertarianinstitute.org/books/voluntaryist-handbook//

Taking my time-:-:-:-with you

The memory of you is still so vivid, clinging to me like warmth on skin. Your body feels so incredibly soft beneath my hands, contrasting with that raw, sharp trace of gasoline in the air.

I can still taste you>>>, every slow, deliberate movement lingering as my tongue circles your nipples, taking my time with you.

<<>>

Every touch is magnified, every breath is heavy, and the sensual charge between us feels impossibly real. ◇ I carry the electric heat of you with me long after we part.

The video call looked entirely ordinary. A finance worker in the Hong Kong office of Arup, the British engineering firm behind the Sydney Opera House and the Beijing National Stadium, sat in front of a screen filled with familiar faces. The company's chief financial officer, based in the United Kingdom, was there. So were several other colleagues, recognisable, talking, moving, present. There had been an email a few days earlier, supposedly from that same CFO, asking for a confidential transaction. The worker had been suspicious. Emails lie. But now here was the CFO himself, on camera, and the request was repeated with the easy authority of a senior executive. Reassured by what he could see and hear, the employee did as he was asked. Over the following days he made fifteen separate transfers, roughly 200 million Hong Kong dollars in total, around 25 million US dollars, into five different bank accounts.

Every other person on that call was a fabrication. The CFO was a deepfake. The colleagues were deepfakes. The entire meeting, the nods and the small talk and the instructions, had been synthesised from publicly available footage of real Arup staff. The only human being in the room was the victim. The fraud was not uncovered by clever technology or a sharp-eyed analyst. It surfaced later, in the most mundane way imaginable, when the employee happened to check in with the company's actual headquarters about the secret payment he had been making. By then the money was gone. Two years on, none of it has been recovered, and nobody has been publicly identified or charged.

The Question We Keep Answering Wrongly

The instinct, reading a story like that, is to ask how the worker could have been fooled, and then to reach for a solution shaped like a better fool-detector. Train staff to spot deepfakes. Buy software that scans video streams for the tell-tale artefacts of synthesis. Teach everyone the current list of giveaways, the unnatural blinking, the odd lighting around the hairline, the faint smear where a jaw meets a neck. This is the reflex of an entire industry, and it is the wrong reflex. It commits us to an arms race we are structurally certain to lose, and it quietly loads the entire weight of defence onto the least reliable component in any system, which is a human being looking at a screen and deciding whether to believe their own eyes.

There is a different question, and it is the one this piece is about. As synthetic deception becomes not merely good but effectively perfect, should our goal be to get better at spotting lies, or to redesign the relationships and everyday processes that currently depend on our ability to detect them at all? The wager here is that the second path is not only possible but already, quietly, winning in the places where people have had the sense to try it. The trick is a reframing so simple it sounds glib until you follow it through. Treat every incoming request as a requirements problem in which the attacker has helpfully written out their preferred solution in advance. Then refuse that solution and satisfy the underlying legitimate need through a channel the attacker cannot reach.

The stakes are not marginal. Long before deepfake video calls entered the picture, the plainest version of this fraud, business email compromise, in which a criminal impersonates a trusted party to redirect a payment, had become one of the most lucrative crimes on earth. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center titled a 2024 advisory “Business Email Compromise: The $55 Billion Scam,” reflecting more than 55 billion US dollars in reported losses worldwide over roughly a decade. The trend since has not bent downwards. The Bureau's report for 2025 records 1,008,597 complaints and 20.877 billion dollars in reported losses, a rise of 26 per cent on the year before, with business email compromise accounting for 3.05 billion of that total, the second costliest category of cyber-enabled fraud after investment scams. Every one of those losses turned on someone believing a message that appeared to come from a party they trusted.

That report also does something none of its predecessors did. For the first time it puts a number on the synthetic contribution specifically, attributing more than 30 million dollars of business email compromise losses to scams involving AI, and more than 5 million to distress scams in which voice cloning was used to imitate a relative. Those sums look modest beside the totals, and it would be a mistake to read them as the measure of the problem. They are a floor rather than a ceiling. A victim can only report what they noticed, and the entire purpose of a competent synthetic is that nobody notices; a cloned voice that works leaves behind a complaint about an ordinary fraud, if it leaves behind a complaint at all. What the figures establish is not the scale of the thing but its arrival in the official ledger. Synthetic voice and video do not invent this problem. They industrialise it, removing the last few grammatical tells and stilted phrasings that once let a careful reader smell a rat. If the defence was already asking too much of human vigilance when the bait was a slightly-off email, it is hopeless now that the bait is a flawless face.

An Arms Race Engineered to Be Lost

Start with why detection fails, because the failure is not a temporary shortfall of engineering effort. It is baked into the mathematics.

Deepfake detection is a contest between two systems, a generator that makes synthetic media and a discriminator that tries to tell real from fake. This is not a metaphor. It is close to a literal description of how many generative models are trained in the first place, with a generator and a discriminator locked in competition, each improving at the other's expense. The problem for the defender is that the generator gets the last move. Any detector you deploy becomes, the moment it exists, a training target. Its outputs can be used to refine the next generation of fakes until they slip past. A recent survey of the field described the situation bluntly as an unwinnable arms race, noting that as generative models approach a near-perfect emulation of real data, a discriminator becomes fundamentally limited in its ability to separate the two.

The empirical record is just as discouraging. Detection systems that post impressive accuracy figures in the laboratory tend to collapse in contact with the real world. Studies have found that detectors trained on the output of one generation model can lose up to 60 per cent of their accuracy when shown content from a different model, and that laboratory performance rarely survives the ordinary indignities of the internet, the recompression, the resizing, the screenshotting that real media undergoes before anyone sees it. A detector is only ever trained on yesterday's fakes. The fraudster is always using tomorrow's.

So the asymmetry is total. The defender must catch every fake, in real time, against generators they have never seen, using tools trained on obsolete examples. The attacker needs to win once. Committing your safety to that contest is like proposing to win a footrace against something that accelerates every time you do.

The Dividend That Rewards the Liar

There is a second, subtler cost to leaning on detection, and it deepens the more successfully you evangelise it. The legal scholars Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron gave it a name in work that began circulating in 2018 and appeared in the California Law Review the following year: the liar's dividend. Their insight was that deepfakes are dangerous not only because they can manufacture convincing falsehoods, but because their mere existence hands a gift to the genuinely guilty. Once the public knows that any video might be synthetic, anyone captured on real footage doing something damaging can simply claim the recording is fake.

The perverse consequence is that the dividend grows in proportion to public awareness. The harder we work to teach everyone that deepfakes are everywhere and undetectable, the more cover we hand to every liar who wants to wave away authentic evidence.

That was a prediction when it was made. It is now a measured effect. A 2024 study in the American Political Science Review put the proposition to more than fifteen thousand people across five survey experiments, and found that politicians who met a scandal by calling the evidence fabricated held on to more support than those who apologised or said nothing. The dividend was largest against written reporting and smallest against video, which is the single crumb of comfort in the finding, and a crumb with an obvious shelf life given where the technology is heading.

It has migrated into the courtroom too. Lawyers acting for Tesla, presented with recordings of Elon Musk making claims about the safety of self-driving cars, declined to confirm that the recordings were authentic, on the reasoning that a man that famous is a natural target for deepfakes. The judge was unimpressed, noting that the argument would let public figures say whatever they liked and afterwards disown it, and ordered Musk to sit for a deposition. In the first trial arising from the January 6 attack on the Capitol, defence counsel pressed an FBI agent on whether the video evidence might have been deepfaked or otherwise altered. Neither attempt succeeded, and that is rather the point: the manoeuvre is now a standard thing to reach for, and it costs nothing to try. A world trained to distrust its own eyes is not a safer world. It is one where truth and falsehood have been flattened into a shrug, and where the burden of proof quietly dissolves.

This is the trap of detection as a strategy. Even when it works it corrodes the thing it was meant to protect, which is a shared confidence that some things can be known. We need an approach that does not require anyone, ever, to look at a piece of media and adjudicate its authenticity.

Reading a Request as an Attacker's Rough Draft

Here is the reframe that changes everything, and it comes not from security folklore but from the discipline of requirements engineering.

When a request arrives, an email from the CFO, a phone call from a panicked relative, a login page asking for your password, it always arrives bundled with a proposed solution. The email does not merely state a need. It prescribes a method: wire the funds to this account, using these details, in this way, now. Security-minded design treats that prescription with the deepest suspicion, because in a fraud the request and the attack are the same object. The attacker has stated their preferred solution up front. The trusted channel, the video call, the caller ID, the familiar logo, is not incidental to the con. It is the payload.

So do not evaluate whether the request is genuine on its own terms. That is playing on the attacker's chosen ground, which is precisely the ground of perception and trust that synthetic media has poisoned. Instead, extract the legitimate underlying requirement, the thing a real CFO would actually need, which is that an authorised payment reaches the right destination, and then satisfy that requirement through a completely different path. A path the attacker never proposed, never expected, and cannot occupy. You do not try to prove the video call was fake. You make it irrelevant by deciding, as a matter of process, that video calls are simply not how payments get authorised. The attacker's carefully crafted solution is invalidated not because it was detected but because it was never a valid channel in the first place.

This is the whole game. Design the channel out. What follows are the places where people already have.

The Phone Call That Would Have Saved Arup

Return to the Hong Kong office and imagine one small rule in place. Any payment instruction above a threshold, no matter how it arrives and no matter how convincing the person delivering it appears, must be confirmed by an outbound call from the finance team to the requesting executive, on a phone number already held in the company directory, not one supplied in the request. This is out-of-band verification, and it is the plainest form of channel invalidation there is.

Notice what it does to the deepfake. The synthetic CFO can be flawless. It can pass every visual test, defeat every detector, sustain a full conversation without a flicker. It changes nothing, because the decision to release funds no longer lives on the video call at all. It lives on a separate channel, initiated by the defender, reaching a destination the attacker does not control. The fraudster has spent enormous effort perfecting a solution to the wrong problem. They optimised for being believed on the call. The process never asked the call to be believed.

The critical detail is the direction and the source of the confirmation. It must be outbound, dialled by the person doing the paying, and it must use contact details established in advance, never details helpfully provided within the suspicious request itself. A fraudster who can insert their own callback number has simply extended their channel, not been forced off it. This is the difference between verification that closes the loop through trusted ground and verification that lets the attacker draw the loop for you. The tragedy of Arup is that the fraud eventually came to light through exactly this kind of independent check, an employee contacting the real headquarters, only after the money had left, rather than before it as a condition of release.

A Word Only Your Family Knows, and a Taxi You Book Yourself

The same logic scales all the way down to the most intimate fraud of the age. Criminals can now clone a person's voice from as little as three seconds of audio, scraped from a social media clip, and use it to call an older relative with a manufactured emergency. A grandchild in a cell, a child in a crash, a frightened voice that sounds unmistakably like family, and an urgent demand for money before anyone can think. In the United Kingdom the messaging version, the “Hi Mum” scam, has run for years, and newer variants now layer cloned voice notes on top of the text. The figures that exist are grim and almost certainly too small. Action Fraud logged around 1.5 million pounds of losses in under twenty weeks of 2022, and half a million in seventeen weeks of 2023. Researchers at University College London, who spent thirteen weeks in conversation with the scammers themselves and were asked for 577,792 pounds in that period alone, put the minimum true annual loss in Britain at 2.3 million. Every one of those numbers is a floor. This kind of fraud is heavily under-reported, partly because victims take it to their bank rather than to the police, and partly because very few people want to sit down and compose a formal statement explaining that they were talked out of their money by somebody pretending to be their child.

You cannot out-listen this. A parent will not reliably distinguish a three-second clone of their own child from the real thing, and asking them to try is cruel and futile. So both the FBI and the Federal Trade Commission now recommend something that has nothing to do with detection at all: a family safe word. A single unguessable phrase, agreed in advance, never posted online, that anyone claiming a genuine emergency must be able to produce. The advice pairs it with a second habit, hanging up and calling the person back on a number you already have.

Look at the structure and it is identical to the corporate case. The requirement is to know that the person in distress is really your kin. The attacker's proposed solution is the recognisable voice, the channel they have poisoned. The safe word invalidates that channel by moving the proof to a shared secret the voice clone does not possess, and the callback moves it to a line the impersonator does not hold. A perfect clone of a voice that does not know the word is a perfect clone of nothing. The synthesis, however good, is aimed at a lock that is no longer on the door. And unlike a training programme in scepticism, which decays and demands constant vigilance, the safe word asks almost nothing of the frightened person on the receiving end. They do not have to stay calm, or reason clearly, or resist a masterful performance of panic. They have to remember to ask one question that the machine on the other end cannot answer.

There is something stronger still, and it is stronger precisely because it does not depend on the safe word working. Every authentication test can fail in two directions. It can admit an impostor, and it can shut out the very person it was built to admit. A frightened teenager in a police station at three in the morning may simply not retrieve an agreed phrase under that much adrenaline, and a competent fraudster arrives already carrying a reason the phrase cannot be produced, a borrowed handset, an officer listening in, a story assembled in advance to explain the gap.

To see why that matters, picture the call as it actually arrives, rather than as it looks in a leaflet about scam awareness. It is three in the morning. You have had a long day, a heavy meal and a few glasses of wine, and you surface from sleep into a conversation that is already under way. It is your daughter. The voice is hers, not an approximation of hers, and she is upset in the particular way you have heard her be upset since she was nine years old. She has been out in the city, she has lost her purse, her phone is nearly dead, and she cannot get home. A cab at that hour will be about a hundred pounds. Nothing in the story is exotic. Nothing in the sum is alarming. You are not being asked to authorise a seven-figure transfer to an unfamiliar corporate account in another jurisdiction, with all the natural friction that such a request would meet. You are being asked for a taxi fare by your own child, which is one of the most ordinary transactions in family life, and the only unusual feature of the entire exchange is the hour, which is exactly the hour at which somebody would lose a purse in a city.

That modesty is not an accident of the story. It is where the economics of the attack have driven it, and the reasoning is worth following because it runs directly against the folklore. A usable clone of a voice now takes something on the order of three seconds of audio. Once that pipeline exists, the marginal cost of producing one more call is effectively nothing. Not low. Nothing worth counting. And when the cost of an attempt falls to nothing, the attempt stops being a craft and becomes a volume business. There is no longer any reason to research one wealthy family for a fortnight and stake the whole operation on a single rehearsed performance, when software that can place a call, hold a conversation and improvise around an answer can be pointed at a list and left running. Whether the true figure is dozens of such calls a day or many thousands is beside the point, and nobody should pretend to know it. The point is that nothing in the cost structure argues for restraint. None of this requires a statistic to see. It follows from the shape of the ledger.

Now follow what free volume does to the size of the ask, because it inverts the oldest tell in the genre. When each attempt is expensive, the demand has to be large to be worth making, and the classic emergency scam duly demanded a great deal. I need two thousand pounds tonight or I am going to prison carries its own warning, because the magnitude is itself the thing that makes a parent stop, breathe and telephone somebody else. Suspicion is triggered by size. A hundred pounds for a taxi triggers nothing whatsoever. It sits beneath the threshold at which anyone begins to interrogate a request, and beneath the threshold at which most people would feel able to interrogate it even if they wished to, since demanding proof of identity before releasing a cab fare feels grotesquely out of proportion to the amount at stake. A small ask therefore converts at a far higher rate than a large one, and when volume is free, the conversion rate is the only variable that matters. A modest sum extracted often will comfortably out-earn a spectacular sum extracted once in a hundred attempts.

So the incentives push the whole category in a single direction, towards requests that are small, plausible, emotionally ordinary and entirely unremarkable. That is precisely the region in which human suspicion is least likely to fire, and precisely the region in which the standard advice, watch for the red flags, is at its most useless, because there is no flag to watch for. The story is mundane. The sum is trivial. The voice is your daughter's. The only thing wrong with the request is that it is not true, and that is the one property of it you cannot observe.

Which is why the answer cannot live in the assessment of the request at all. Push the reframe that runs through this entire argument one level deeper, from who is calling to what is being asked for. Send a hundred pounds to this account, right now, is not a need. It is a proposed solution, drafted by whoever is on the line, and in a fraud the proposal is the attack. Beneath it sits a requirement, and requirements can nearly always be satisfied in more than one way. Your daughter, stranded across the city at three in the morning, does not need a hundred pounds in an account you have never seen before tonight. She needs to get home safely. So book the taxi yourself, from your own phone, to your own address, and tell the caller that the car is coming. Or get into your own car and go and fetch her.

The same is true of the other everyday version of the call. Your mother telephones from the supermarket. Her card has been declined at the checkout, the trolley is full, there are grandchildren hanging off the side of it and a queue lengthening behind her, and she needs a hundred and fifty pounds. This is genuinely distressing and entirely credible, because cards fail for a dozen dull reasons and invariably choose the worst possible moment to do it. But she does not need a hundred and fifty pounds. She needs her shopping paid for, and a supermarket is perfectly capable of taking payment from you over its own telephone, on a number you have looked up yourself rather than one you have been given. Someone under arrest does not need bail money within the hour either. They need legal representation, which is arranged through a solicitor and confirmed on the police station's own published number. In every case the need survives intact. Only the payment route disappears.

Consider now the two people who might be at the other end of that call. A real relative is usually relieved. They named a sum because money looked like the obvious instrument, not because money was the point, and a cab already on its way solves their night rather better than a transfer they would still have to spend. A fraudster can accept none of it, and cannot say why. Their requirement was never transport or a solicitor or a trolley of shopping. It was irreversible funds landing in an account they control, and a taxi paid for by somebody else satisfies precisely none of that. So they have to argue. Why the cab will not do, why the shop cannot be telephoned, why the solicitor is not an option, why it has to be this account and it has to be now, and why every safe route to the very thing they said they needed is somehow the one route that will not work. That escalating refusal to let the stated need be met by any other means is the tell, and it is the process that produces it rather than the ear.

This is the family protocol at its most complete, because at no point does it require you to decide whether the voice is real. The safe word still poses a question and waits on an answer that may never come. Meeting the requirement instead of the request asks nothing of your judgement at all. You can be entirely taken in at three in the morning, believe every syllable, and be out nothing but the twenty minutes it took to book a cab that nobody climbed into. It also keeps compassion intact under uncertainty, which is what the standard advice quietly sacrifices, since hanging up on somebody who might be your child in real trouble is a hard thing to ask of anybody, and asking it of them at three in the morning is harder still. The real emergency is answered at once. The manufactured one collapses, not because anybody saw through the fake but because the one thing the attacker wanted was the one thing never on offer. And note that none of it turns on the size of the request, which matters more than it first appears now that the economics have driven the asking price down below the level at which anyone thinks to be suspicious. The move works identically at a hundred pounds and at twenty five million dollars, because it never once asks whether the amount looks wrong.

The Bank That Stopped Trusting the Name on the Screen

Financial infrastructure has been quietly rebuilding itself along these lines for years, largely out of public view. Two examples stand out because they attack fraud not by spotting bad actors but by removing the conditions the fraud depends on.

The first is Confirmation of Payee, the account-name-checking service that has been mandatory across the British payments system since 2020. When you set up a payment, the scheme checks whether the name you have entered actually matches the name on the destination account, and warns you when it does not. Authorised push payment fraud, the category that includes most impersonation scams, relies on the victim believing they are paying a trusted party while the money in fact flows to the criminal. Confirmation of Payee attacks the join between the story and the destination. It does not care how persuasive the fraudster was. It checks, mechanically, whether the account the victim is about to pay belongs to who they think it does. After introducing it, Lloyds reported a 31 per cent reduction in this kind of fraud, and by late 2024 the regulator had extended coverage to the overwhelming majority of British bank transfers, with millions of checks running every day.

It would be wrong to present that as a cure. Confirmation of Payee shut one specific gap, the mismatch between the name a victim believes they are paying and the account that actually receives the money, but authorised push payment fraud has gone on growing and mutating around it, and the researchers who documented the “Hi Mum” scam describe it as an entirely new species of the same crime, one a name check does nothing to stop, because the fraudster supplies the account name along with the number. No single control ends a category of fraud, which is precisely why the argument here is for a layered design discipline rather than for one clever mechanism.

The second is positive pay, a long-standing corporate banking service in the United States, worth studying because its default is so instructive. A company sends its bank a list of the cheques it has legitimately issued, with the numbers, amounts and payees. When a cheque is presented, the bank pays it only if it matches the list. Anything that does not match is not paid pending review. The default is no. Trust is not extended and then withdrawn on suspicion. It is withheld until a positive, pre-established match grants it. A forged cheque does not need to be recognised as forged. It simply fails to appear on the list of things the account holder said they would honour, and that absence, not any act of detection, is what stops it.

There is a third move in British payments, and it is not a mechanism at all. Since 7 October 2024, payment firms have been obliged to reimburse victims of authorised push payment fraud up to 85,000 pounds a claim, with the cost of that reimbursement split equally between the firm that sent the money and the firm that received it. Read the split carefully, because it is the whole of the idea. The receiving firm, the one that banked the fraudster, had until then no particular financial reason to care very much who it was banking. It now pays half of whatever its customer takes.

This is the liability version of designing the channel out. It stops asking whether the victim ought to have known better, which is the same losing question as whether they ought to have spotted the fake, and places the cost on the institutions that designed the process the victim was moving through. The people who can actually change the architecture are handed a direct financial reason to change it. Incentive follows design responsibility, and it is remarkable how rarely anybody arranges things that way round.

The early evidence is that this works in the dull, mechanical fashion good incentives tend to. An independent evaluation for the regulator, published this July, found that losses within the scheme's scope had fallen by an estimated 73 million pounds a year, that the number of scams had dropped by nearly thirty-five thousand, that reimbursement of in-scope claims had reached 97 per cent, and, most tellingly of all, that the largest improvements came from precisely those firms with the worst fraud levels before the rule existed. Predictions that firms would flee the market or that consumers, insured against their own carelessness, would become reckless did not materialise. Nobody in this story got better at recognising a fraudster. The bill simply began arriving at the address where the design decisions were made.

The Login That Cannot Be Phished

The most complete example of detection-independent design is one that billions of people now use without knowing its name. It is the passkey, and the standards beneath it, FIDO2 and WebAuthn, are worth understanding precisely because they make an entire category of attack structurally impossible rather than merely detectable. The scale has stopped being niche while nobody was watching. On World Passkey Day this May the FIDO Alliance put the number in circulation worldwide at around five billion, with 75 per cent of the people it surveyed having enabled one on at least one account and 90 per cent now aware the things exist at all.

Password phishing is the original synthetic-deception fraud. A fake page impersonates a real one, and the human, unable to tell the counterfeit from the genuine article, hands over their credentials. Two decades of defence have consisted largely of asking people to look harder, to inspect the address bar, to hover over links, to develop a sixth sense for the fraudulent. It has not worked, because it is the same losing bet as deepfake detection, human perception against an adversary who controls the appearance of things.

FIDO2 refuses the bet entirely. When you register a passkey, your device generates a cryptographic key pair. The private key never leaves your hardware, protected inside a secure element. The website only ever receives the public half. When you log in, the site sends a challenge, your device signs it with the private key, and, this is the load-bearing part, the signature is cryptographically bound to the exact web origin making the request. Your browser will not release a credential to a domain that does not match the one it was created for. Full stop. There is no dialogue box, no judgement call, no moment where a tired human decides whether the site looks right. If a phishing page is even one character off in its address, the credential is simply never offered. The user cannot be tricked into handing it over because there is no longer anything to hand over and no human decision in the loop to subvert. The American standards body has since written the architecture into its rulebook, the current NIST Digital Identity Guidelines treating synced passkeys as phishing-resistant for exactly this reason, that the key pair is constrained to the domain in which it was created, and admitting them up to the second of its three assurance levels.

The results are not theoretical. Google mandated physical security keys for its entire workforce, more than 85,000 people, in early 2017, and subsequently reported that not a single employee had been successfully phished on their work account since. Not few. None. That is what it looks like when you stop trying to detect an attack and instead engineer away the conditions that let it exist. The phishing page can be a flawless replica. It is aimed at a lock that no longer accepts the key it is trying to steal.

Signing Reality Instead of Interrogating It

Even where the goal is to know whether a piece of media is authentic, the winning approach inverts the problem. Rather than examining a photograph or a video after the fact for signs of fakery, an unwinnable inspection, you attach a verifiable record of provenance at the moment of creation and carry it forward through every edit.

This is the work of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, known as C2PA, an open standards body formed in 2021 by founding members including Adobe, Arm, the BBC, Intel, Microsoft and the verification firm Truepic, and now steered by a roster that has grown to include Amazon, Google, Meta, OpenAI, Sony and others under the umbrella of the Linux Foundation. Its output is a technical specification, Content Credentials, that records who made a piece of content, when, with what tools, whether AI was involved, and every meaningful edit since. Crucially, that record is cryptographically hashed and signed, making it tamper-evident. Alter the media and break the seal, and the tampering shows.

The philosophical move here is exactly the one this whole argument turns on. As the standard's own advocates put it, Content Credentials do not tell you whether a piece of content is true. They tell you where it came from and what has been done to it. Provenance replaces perception. Instead of asking the impossible question, is this image fake, which pits the viewer against the full power of a generator, you ask an answerable one, does this image carry an intact, signed chain of custody back to a source I trust. The absence of credentials is not proof of forgery, and the presence of them is not proof of virtue, but the framework shifts the ground from the ungrounded adjudication of pixels to the verifiable adjudication of cryptography. It is significant enough that national security agencies have begun publishing guidance recommending exactly this approach for defending the integrity of multimedia in the generative era, and that image generators such as OpenAI's now attach these credentials to what they produce.

Until very recently the obvious objection to all this was that it is voluntary, and that a standard nobody is obliged to implement is a standard the fraudulent will simply decline to use. That objection is expiring. The coalition passed six thousand members and affiliates in January of this year. Credential creation has moved out of professional tooling and into ordinary consumer hardware, with Google's Pixel 10 signing photographs in the camera application itself and Samsung's Galaxy S25 range attaching credentials to images its own AI tools have altered. And the practice is turning into a legal requirement. Article 50 of the European Union's AI Act, which obliges providers to mark synthetic audio, image, video and text in a machine-readable format, applies from 2 August, which is now a matter of days away. California's AI Transparency Act, originally due to commence in January, was amended to begin on that same date.

Notice what that says about the direction of travel. Nobody has legislated a duty to detect deepfakes, because no such duty could be discharged; you cannot write into law an obligation to win an arms race. What is being legislated instead is a duty to declare provenance at the moment of creation, which can be discharged, by machines, at scale, without asking a single human being to look at an image and adjudicate. That is what it looks like from the outside when a detection-independent approach wins the argument.

Never Trust, Always Verify, at Machine Scale

The most systemic expression of this philosophy has a name that has become a corporate buzzword and deserves rescuing from it: zero trust. Codified by the American National Institute of Standards and Technology in its Special Publication 800-207 in 2020, the model rests on a phrase that sounds paranoid until you realise it is simply the mature response to undetectable deception. Never trust, always verify.

Traditional security built a hard perimeter and trusted everything inside it, the digital equivalent of checking identity at the front door and then letting anyone who got past it roam the building. Zero trust abolishes the inside. Every request for a resource, regardless of where it originates, must be authenticated, authorised and continuously validated, and is granted only the minimum privilege required to do the specific task at hand. No actor is trusted by default on the strength of appearing to belong.

Read that through the lens of synthetic fraud and it is the same design principle industrialised. A deepfake, a cloned voice, a spoofed email, a stolen session, all of them are attempts to appear to belong, to be trusted on the basis of how they present. A system that extends no default trust to presentation, that insists on fresh cryptographic proof for every action and confines every actor to least authority, is a system to which a convincing appearance simply buys nothing. The impersonation may be perfect. Perfection of appearance is precisely the currency the architecture refuses to accept.

Five Principles for a World You Cannot Verify by Eye

Pull these examples together and a coherent design discipline emerges, one that any organisation, and to a surprising degree any family, can adopt without waiting for better detectors that are never going to arrive.

The first principle is to verify the requirement, not the requester. Do not spend your effort deciding whether the person or the message in front of you is genuine, a judgement the attacker has spent their entire effort corrupting. Identify the legitimate need underneath the request and satisfy it through a channel of your own choosing. The Arup callback, the family safe word and the whole logic of out-of-band confirmation live here. So does the harder version, satisfying the stated need by a route of your own, since a caller who will accept only one route has told you what the request was really for.

The second is to prefer structural impossibility over probabilistic detection. Wherever you can, choose designs that make an attack fail by construction rather than designs that try to notice it happening. A passkey that cannot be surrendered to the wrong domain is categorically safer than a filter that tries to spot the wrong domain, because the former has no failure mode that depends on being observant at the right instant.

The third is to make the default deny, and require positive, pre-established confirmation to proceed. Positive pay honours only what was declared in advance. Confirmation of Payee refuses to let a mismatched name pass silently. A system whose resting state is no, released only by an affirmative match, does not have to recognise a threat in order to stop it. It only has to fail to recognise a friend, which is a far safer way to be wrong.

The fourth is to choose provenance over perception. When authenticity genuinely matters, bind a verifiable, tamper-evident record to the thing at the point of creation and check that record, rather than interrogating the finished artefact with your senses. Cryptographic chains of custody are the answer to a world in which the artefact itself can be perfectly counterfeited.

The fifth, underpinning all the others, is to refuse to make the human the last line of defence. Every design above shares a refusal to load the final, irreversible decision onto a person's ability to detect a fake under pressure. Google did not train 85,000 people to spot better phishing pages. It removed the possibility that spotting was required. The safe word does not ask a frightened grandparent to become a forensic audio analyst. It gives them a rule a machine cannot satisfy. The kindest and most robust systems assume the human will be fooled, because eventually, against a good enough fake, they will be, and they arrange things so that being fooled is not catastrophic.

Designing So That Belief Is No Longer Load-Bearing

None of this means detection has no place. A deepfake screener at the edge of a video platform, a provenance signal in a newsroom, a filter that culls the most obvious fraud before it reaches a human, all have value as friction, as triage, as one layer among many. The error is to make detection the thing your safety rests on, to treat the arms race as winnable and the human eye as a reliable sensor. It is neither.

The deeper shift is almost philosophical. For most of history, trust between people and institutions has been mediated by perception. We believed a face we recognised, a voice we knew, a letterhead, a familiar login screen. Synthetic media has quietly severed the link between how something appears and what it is, and no amount of squinting will reconnect it. The mature response is not to squint harder. It is to stop making belief load-bearing. To build relationships and processes in which the question is never whether this looks real, but whether it can complete a path that a counterfeit cannot walk, a callback answered on a known line, a word only kin possess, a need met by a route the caller did not choose, a signature bound to the true domain, an account name that matches, a credential that cannot be surrendered to a stranger.

The engineers who fell victim in Hong Kong were not foolish. They were placed, by a process that trusted appearances, in a position no human should be asked to occupy, adjudicating in real time the authenticity of a flawless fabrication, with millions of dollars riding on the guess. The lesson is not that they should have looked harder. It is that they should never have had to look at all. Every incoming request already contains the attacker's preferred solution, stated plainly and dressed in whatever trust the moment allows. Our task is not to see through the disguise. It is to build a world where the disguise, however perfect, opens nothing.

References

1. CNN Business, “Arup revealed as victim of $25 million deepfake scam involving Hong Kong employee,” 16 May 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk
2. Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), “Business Email Compromise: The $55 Billion Scam,” 11 September 2024. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA240911
3. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, “2025 Internet Crime Report,” 2026. https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf
4. arXiv, “The Unwinnable Arms Race of AI Image Detection,” 2025. https://arxiv.org/html/2509.21135
5. Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron, “Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security,” California Law Review, vol. 107, 2019. https://www.californialawreview.org/print/deep-fakes-a-looming-challenge-for-privacy-democracy-and-national-security
6. Kaylyn Jackson Schiff, Daniel S. Schiff and Natalia S. Bueno, “The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability?,” American Political Science Review, 2024. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/liars-dividend-can-politicians-claim-misinformation-to-evade-accountability/687FEE54DBD7ED0C96D72B26606AA073
7. Thomson Reuters Institute, “Deepfakes on trial: How judges are navigating AI evidence authentication,” 8 May 2025. https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/ai-in-courts/deepfakes-evidence-authentication/
8. American Bar Association, “Deepfakes and Digital Evidence at Trial: Who Are You Going to Believe, the AI or Your Lying Eyes?,” 2024. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/resources/magazine/2024-may-june/deepfakes-digital-evidence-trial/
9. Federal Communications Commission, “'Grandparent' Scams Get More Sophisticated.” https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/scam-alert/grandparent-scams-get-more-sophisticated
10. CBS News, “AI voice scams are on the rise. Here's how to protect yourself.” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elder-scams-family-safe-word/
11. Sharad Agarwal, Emma Harvey, Enrico Mariconti, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil and Marie Vasek, “'Hey mum, I dropped my phone down the toilet': Investigating Hi Mum and Dad SMS Scams in the United Kingdom,” 34th USENIX Security Symposium, 2025. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/agarwal-sharad
12. Pay.UK, “Confirmation of Payee.” https://www.wearepay.uk/what-we-do/overlay-services/confirmation-of-payee/
13. Payment Systems Regulator, “PSR finalises plans for the wider implementation of fraud prevention tool, Confirmation of Payee.” https://www.psr.org.uk/news-and-updates/latest-news/news/psr-finalises-plans-for-the-wider-implementation-of-fraud-prevention-tool-confirmation-of-payee/
14. Payment Systems Regulator, “PS24/7 Faster Payments APP scams reimbursement requirement: Confirming the maximum level of reimbursement,” 2 October 2024. https://www.psr.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps247-faster-payments-app-scams-reimbursement-requirement-confirming-the-maximum-level-of-reimbursement/
15. Payment Systems Regulator, “Payment fraud falls by GBP 73m following PSR reimbursement scheme,” 1 July 2026. https://www.psr.org.uk/news-and-updates/latest-news/news/payment-fraud-falls-by-73m-following-psr-reimbursement-scheme/
16. Regions Bank, “Positive Pay: Detect & Prevent Check Fraud.” https://www.regions.com/commercial-banking/treasury-management/fraud-prevention-resources/positive-pay
17. FIDO Alliance, “FIDO Alliance Reports Accelerating Global Passkey Adoption on World Passkey Day 2026,” 7 May 2026. https://fidoalliance.org/fido-alliance-reports-accelerating-global-passkey-adoption-on-world-passkey-day-2026/
18. National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management,” NIST Special Publication 800-63B-4, August 2025. https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html
19. Krebs on Security, “Google: Security Keys Neutralized Employee Phishing,” 24 July 2018. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neutralized-employee-phishing/
20. Content Authenticity Initiative, “The State of Content Authenticity in 2026,” 18 January 2026. https://contentauthenticity.org/blog/the-state-of-content-authenticity-in-2026
21. C2PA, “Providing Origins of Media Content.” https://c2pa.org/
22. National Security Agency, “Strengthening Multimedia Integrity in the Generative AI Era,” January 2025. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/29/2003634788/-1/-1/0/CSI-CONTENT-CREDENTIALS.PDF
23. European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, “Article 50: Transparency Obligations for Providers and Deployers of Certain AI Systems.” https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/50/
24. California Legislative Information, “SB 942: California AI Transparency Act.” https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB942
25. National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Zero Trust Architecture,” NIST Special Publication 800-207, August 2020. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/final

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Tim Green UK-based Systems Theorist & Independent Technology Writer

Tim explores the intersections of artificial intelligence, decentralised cognition, and posthuman ethics. His work, published at smarterarticles.co.uk, challenges dominant narratives of technological progress while proposing interdisciplinary frameworks for collective intelligence and digital stewardship.

His writing has been featured on Ground News and shared by independent researchers across both academic and technological communities.

ORCID: 0009-0002-0156-9795 Email: tim@smarterarticles.co.uk

Listen to the free weekly SmarterArticles Podcast

I recently started reading Becky Chambers, one of the leading voices of cozy sci-fi. As she neatly puts it:

Cozy science-fiction can be very simply summed up as stories that tell you that the future can be good.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILUTQEH3xzc

Although I love dystopias, I believe cozy sci-fi has its place. Endless pessimism simply isn't healthy.

I've come to realize that, over the past few months, I had begun to cultivate the same kind of mindset through something very simple: walking.

More recently, I read Way Station by Clifford #Simak. Amazing novel! And it's packed full of cozy sci-fi tropes: optimism, quietness, slowness, a sense of wonder, and meaningful connections.

One detail in particular caught my attention. Enoch Wallace, the protagonist, takes daily walks. Walking mattered to him. Lately, it has come to matter to me as well.

Three months ago, I started walking just 30 minutes a day to move a bit more. Since then, I’ve gradually increased the distance to 15,000–20,000 steps a day, split into two sessions.

It has done me a world of good. In many ways, walking is a deeply “cozy” activity. It slows things down. It creates space for the mind to wander, lessens anxiety, boosts mood for hours and sometimes the entire day... I could keep going for a while. As the saying goes, motion is lotion. But to sum it up, it's a kind of healthy mental bubble. As Simak writes:

He walked as if he had all the time there was.

And to quote the American philosopher Thoreau:

An early-morning walk is a blessing for the whole day.

_

Methinks that the moment my legs begin to move, my thoughts begin to flow.

_

I think that I cannot preserve my health and spirits, unless I spend four hours a day at least — and it is commonly more than that — sauntering through the woods and over the hills and fields, absolutely free from all worldly engagements.

If you decide to pick up the habit, I recommend you start small and listen to your body. Don't overdo it at first, and gradually increase. Overtraining is a real thing.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBN86y30Ufc

To bring things full circle: if you want to delve into cozy sci-fi yourself, I highly recommend Becky Chambers' Monk & Robot novellas duology (but most of her other books fill the bill). Here's the wiki page for the first one. I also recommend the aforementioned novel Way Station. Together, these three make a solid starter pack.

The future partly belongs to us.

#thoughts

Image: Julia Royer (copyright 2026)

In Summary: * Yard work and baseball, that sums up this Tuesday. An hour and a half this morning working in the back yard and the big green organics bin is now totally stuffed, ready for its collection on Thursday morning.

Earlier this afternoon I stumbled onto a Triple-A Minor League Baseball Game being broadcast live on MLB Network. It was great fun watching the Tacoma Rainiers playing the Sacramento River Cats. That game ended just a few minutes ago, and I'm now listening to the Rangers Gameday Pregame Show ahead of tonight's MLB Rangers vs Rays Game.

All things considered, this has been a pretty good day in the Roscoe-verse.

Prayers, etc.: * I have a daily prayer regimen I try to follow throughout the day from early morning, as soon as I roll out of bed, until head hits pillow at night.

Health Metrics: * bw= 228.40 lbs. * bp= 122/73 (76)

Exercise: * morning stretches, balance exercises, kegel pelvic floor exercises, half squats, calf raises, wall push-ups, BP breathing exercises, pilates

Diet: * 05:05 – 1 banana * 05:30 – 1 peanut butter sandwich * 06:00 – 1 ham & cheese sandwich * 13:00 – baked salmon with spinach and mushroom sauce * 15:30 – dish of ice cream

Activities, Chores, etc.: * 03:00 – listen to local news talk radio * 03:30 – bank accounts activity monitored. * 05:20 – read, write, pray, follow news reports from various sources, surf the socials, nap * 08:45 – stock recently arrived groceries. * 10:00 to 11:40 – yard work, cutting and carrying branches, mowing into the back yard jungle, loading the big green organics bin for the Thursday collection * 13:00 – watch old game shows and eat lunch at home with Sylvia * 14:40 – now watching Triple-A Minor League Baseball on MLB Network, Sacramento River Cats vs Tacoma Rainiers, in the 3rd inning Tacoma leads 1 to 0. * 16:50 – Tacoma wins this one, 8 to 4 * 17:00 – Now tuned into 105.3 The Fan, DFW's #1 Sports Station, ahead of this tonight's Rangers vs Rays MLB game. I plan to stay here for the radio-call of the game.

Chess: * 14:30 – moved in all pending CC games

The moon is full behind a thin veil of clouds, looking almost orange against the late summer night sky’s deep but not dark blue

I’m on vacation at a castle, this month’s salary spent already on halloumi burgers with home made french fries

Here in my room I glimpse it (the moon) through the open window. I hear the blowing fan sounding like the rustling of leaves outside. And sometimes a car in the distance, or someone french sounding carelessly talking to someone right outside.

Upsetting the dogs of course

I thought of my neurotic black dog again today when I ate the burger; he freaks out about things only his keen dog ears can hear, or if there’s unexpected movements at the corner of his eye or if another dog walks by,

I think that there’s no way for him to know that those sounds or dogs aren’t dangerous; in reality there’s no way to know for sure — what if one of these guys with a Sabaton t-shirt hates dogs and tries to kidnap him or worse? It’s by being careful that we as species can survive. At least some specimen of each kind ought to have this vivid imagination for spotting danger

But it’s exhausting to worry about everything, life may pass you by and you might’ve been too worried about what might go wrong to live, and it ends with death even for the most careful

I thought about there was this Norwegian doctor who said something along the line that you extend your life by jogging, but maybe not by more than the time spent doing it, so you better like it. Or something to that effect.

Maybe it’s the same with worrying, that maybe you’ll live longer due to being able to avoid potential dangers, but the price you pay for it is pretty high, so you better enjoy worrying.